Business Finance and Banking by Neil H. Jacoby & Raymond J. Saulnier
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Business Finance and Banking





Chapter Title: Changes in Commercial Bank Relations with Business:
1900-1940
Chapter Author: Neil H. Jacoby , Raymond J. Saulnier
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4684
Chapter pages in book: (p. 69 - 109)Part II
BUSINESS CREDIT MARKET CHANGES
FROM 1900 TO 1940
tVChapter 3
CHANGESINCOMMERCIALBANKRELATIONS
. WITH BUSINESS: 1900—1940
CHANGES SINCE 1900 IN the relations between commercial banks
and nonfinancial business enterprises have resulted from numerous
economic tendencies. One of the most important is the shift in the
structure or composition of the economy, reflecting the fact that all
segments of the economy have not grown at the same rate. An in-
creased relative importance of industries showing a less than average
dependence on bank credit tends to weaken business demand for such
credit while, conversely, the growth of industries with higher than
average dependence on bank credit strengthens the demand. From
the point of view of this study, the significant structural changes are
those relating to the industrial and size composition of the business
population; as indicated in Chapter i, these changes directly affect
the demand by business enterprises for credit.
CHANGING RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INDUSTRIES
AND BUSINESS CREDIT DEMANDS
Changes in the industrial composition of the American economy
appear to have been as to prevent bank credit to nonfinancial
business from sharing fully in the growth of the whole economy.
This is certainly true of developments after World War I. A break-
down of national income by major industrial divisions for the
period 1919—38 reveals marked declines in the relative importance
in the economy as a whole of agriculture and manufacturing as
sources of income; somewhat less significant declines in mining and
construction; and definite increases in the service industries and
government (Chart iDatacovering the distribution of gross
national product by industrial origin also reveal that the relative
importance of manufacturing and agriculture decreased after
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Chart.i2— NATIONALINCOME DERIVED FROM1919;lesser degrees
MAJOR INDUSTRIAL DIVISIONS, 1919—38 ofdecline occurred in
mining,construction,
and trade; transporta-
tion and other public
utilities shared a slight
increase; and the serv-
ice and government di-
visions rose very mark-




to the over-all demand
for business creditis
clear. The sectors —
manufacturingand ag-
riculture —thatsuf-
fered the greatest rela-
tive decline accounted
for substantial parts of
the total demand for
credit; those that en-
joyed the greatest rela-
After 1919, agriculture, manufactur- tive increase were gov—
ing,mining, and constructionde- ernmentwhich does
dined as contributors to national in-
come; service industries and govern- not produce any direct
ment grew in importance; other in- demand for business fi-
dustries changed but little. nancing services' of fi-
nancialagencies, and
theservicetrades,
which despite their growth are a minor element in the business
credit market. Industrial divisions like transportation and other
public utilities, which held their own over the period, were sig-
nificant borrowers only in the open market and were interested
primarily in long-term rather than short-term funds.
Since most of the data bearing on changes in industrial composi--
tion go back only to 1919, it is to' be certain' whether the
shifts were movements that set in after Wbrld War I or were
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Chart 13—CHANGESIN THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF SELECTED MANU-
FACTURING INDUSTRIES TO TOTAL MANUFACTURING OUTPUT, 1899—
1937, COMPARED WITH DEPENDENCE ON BANK CREDIT, 1937
Percent Percent
I I
Petroleum and Coal Products
Payable Percent
of Total Assets





















In general, the manufacturing industries that made the greatest
strides between 1899 and 1937 in their relative contribution to
total manufacturing output were those that in 1937 were the least
dependent on bank credit for the financing of assets.74. BUSINESSFINANCE AND BANKING
tinuations of changes that were operatingbefore the war. There is
some evidence, however, which leads to the following conclusions:
first, that the shifts in the relative importance of agriculture,
government and, in all probability, service industries began prior to
World War I, and, second, that the declining importance of manu—
facturing was mainly a postwar phenomenon reflecting the read-
justmentof production from the high level of output elicited dur-
ing the war by the needs of the military services. In any event, the
fact that the changes cited occurred in the period after 1919 is
sufficient for this study, since it was only after 1919 that the growth
in direct bank loans to business was interrupted.
Paralleling changes in the relative importance of the main indus—
trial divisions of the economy were changes in the relative contri-
bution of selected manufacturing industries to total manufacturing
output (Chart i 3). The significant fact about these data is that, in
general, the manufacturing subdivisions which showed the greatest
percentage increase in output-contribution after i 899 were among
those industries that relied least on notes payable for the financing
of their assets. On the other hand, the manufacturing subdivisions
that tended to depend most heavily on banks for their financing
showed only a moderate rate of expansion, or even some decline.
OF CHANGING SIZE OF BUSINESS
ON CREDIT DEMANDS
As pointed out in Chapter I, the small and medium-sized concern
provided the major market for bank loan credit around 1940.
Doubtless the demand from this size group of enterprises was even
greater in 1900, and, therefore, it is of interest to ask what hap-
pened to the average size of business concern between 1900 and
1940. Over these years a decreasing proportion of the number of
business concerns was accounting for an increasing proportion of the
total volume of production and trade. For part of this period,
1923—27, this is indicated by the fact that sales of a sample of large
manufacturing and trade corporations increased 67 percent while
the value of product of all business enterprises increased only 6 per-
cent.1
'AlbertR. Koch, The Financing of Large Corporations, 1920—1939 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, p.BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 75
Chart 14— PERCENTAGEDISTRIBUTION, BY TYPE OF BUSINESS AND
ASSET SIZE, OF NUMBER OF NONFINANCIAL BUSINESSES HAVING
CORPORATE BONDS OUTSTANDING, 1900 AND 1939
Other evidence regarding changes in the size composition of
business during this period is more indirect. Of the relevant and
available information, the most comprehensive and useful is that
relating to the sizes of concerns having corporate bonds outstand-
ing in 1900 and 1939. These data reveal a shift toward larger
average size in each of the major industrial divisions (Chart 14).
The real changes that occurred may have been greater than indi-
cated, however, since the data are probably more representative of
the small and medium-sized concern in 1940 than in 1900.
A shift toward larger size in business enterprises is indicated also
by data based on a sample of business listings drawn from the
For each major type of business, corporations with assets of $5 million
and over comprised a larger percentage of all corporations with bonds
outstanding in 1939 than they did in 1900.76 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
Reference Book of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., for 1900, 1920, and
1.940, showing what percentage of the total number of concerns had
net worth in excess of $200,000, and by data prepared for the
Temporary National Economic Committee, giving percentage dis-
tributions of establishments in 1914 and 1937 according to the
number of wage earners employed. The Dun & Bradstreet data
(Table io) reveal a shift toward larger average size between 1900
and 1940 in every industrial division except wholesale trade, with
the shift particularly, marked for manufacturing and mining con-
cerns, two categories which are of major importance in the total de-
mand by business for credit. The tendency for the average size of
wholesaling concerns to decline important, since this is
the one type' of concern for which dependence on bank credit in-
creases in relative importance as asset size increases.
The TNEC data reveal that establishments employing fewer
than twenty-one employees constituted 73.6 percent of all establish-
ments in 1914 and 69.2 percent in 1937. In the field of retail trade
notable changes were brought about by the growth of mail-order,
chain, and department stores. These types of merchandising were of
negligible importance at the turn of the century; by 1935, however,
chain stores, for example, were making nearly one-fourth of all
retail sales, selling over a third of the groceries, half of the shoes,
and over nine-tenths of the' variety goods.
Table 10—PERCENTAGE OF NUMBER OF CONCERNS
WITH NET WORTH IN EXCESS OF $200,000, 1W MAJOR
INDUSTRIAL DIVISIONS, 1900, 1920, AND
industrial Divisioii ' 1900 1920 1940
Manufacturing 4.0% 7.6% 9.3%
Wholesaleb . 11.3 15.9 9.7
Retail , • .2 .3 .3
Service .3 ' ..6 .8
Construction
'.3 .4 .8
Mining i.6 4.6 13.4
Miscellaneous 1.0 1.5 1.1
TOTAL SAMPLE i.i% 1.7% i.8%
a Estimates of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Pro-
gram, based 'on a sample drawn from Reference Book of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,1900,
1920, and1940.
bIncludes concerns dealing in both wholesale and retail trade.BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 77
From this scattered evidence, and from the relationships ob-
served in Chapter i—namely,that larger concerns are in general
less dependent on banks for credit than are smaller concerns.— it
may be concluded that business demand for credit in general, and
for bank credit in was weakened in the period 1900—
1940 by shifts in the distribution of nonfinancial businesses by asset
size classes.
CHANGES IN BUSINESS ASSETS AND THEIR EFFECTS
ON THE CREDIT MARKET•
Changes after 1900 in the asset structure of nonfinancial business are
of significance, since (as pointed out in Chapter i) the types of assets
heldby a business enterprise strongly influence the amount and kind.
of funds which the management uses for financing. Unfortunately,
data on assets for business as a whole do not exist back to 1900, but
several samples of corporation financial statements have been
assembled extending back to 1900, 1914, or 1916. These samples
cover (i) large manufacturing and large trade enterprises, (2)
small and medium-sized manufacturing and trade concerns, and
acombination of large manufacturing and trade concerns
termed an "industrial" gr2 other tabulations are for public
utilities and railroads. Findings based on a study of these samples
will be stated here in a general manner, indicating the broad char-
acter of the changes that occurred in assets and the relation of these
changes to credit demand.
Fixed Assets8
In general, a tendency for fixed assets to grow in relation to total
assets would be expected to produce a shift in favor of long-term
2Thesample data for large manufacturing and trade corporations are described in
Albert R. Koch, op. cit., pp. and Charles H. Schmidt and Ralph A. Young, Tue
Effect of War on Business Financing: Manufacturing and Trade, World War! (Na..
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, Our Economy in
War, Occasional Paper io, November 1943) Appendix A. For information covering
the large "industrial" group and small and medium-sized concerns, see footnotes 5 and
6, below.
8Thereis, of course, no escape from the fact that on the asset side of the balance
sheet the valuation of fixed assets may reflect more closely accounting conventions than
financial conditions; nor equally the fact that the• element of arbitrariness which this
involves is reflected among business liabilities in the net worth item. While it surely is
wise to view data on fixed assets and net worth with reserve, it is nonetheless possible to
utilize these data to increase our understanding of the financial process and particularly
of the changing role in business financing of funds acquired on a debt basis.78 BUSINESS FINANCE ANfl BANKING
Chart—RATIOSOF SELECTED ASSET ITEMS TO TOTAL AssETs FOR SAMPLES
OF LARGE MANUFACTURING AND TRADE CORPORATIONS, 1900—1940
FIXED ASSETS ALL NONCURRENT ASSETS








For large corporations, the marked rise in noncurrent assets, consist-
ing primarily of fixed assets and in other companies, from
World War I to the thirties served to place increasing emphasis on
long-term financing. The greater liquidity of corporations as meas-
ured by the proportion of assets held in the form of cash and market-BANK REL-ATIONS WITH BUSINESS 79
as against short—term financing. What is the evidence with respect
to this matter?
Fixed assets of both large manufacturing and large trade con-
cerns during the twenties showed a marked tendency to grow in re-
lation to total assets, and subsequently declined from the level then
attained (Chart iAnanalysis of large manufacturing concerns
by industrial groups reveals that in most cases the trend was much
like that for all groups combined; only in a few industries —par-
ticularly food manufacturing —didfixed assets tend to become less
important during the twenties. It is especially notable that the
petroleum industry, which was one of the most rapidly growing
segments of the manufacturing economy, showed marked increases
in its proportion of fixed to total assets.
At least during the years from the end of World War I to the
early thirties, the effect of an increase of considerable magnitude
in the relative importance of fixed assets was probably to shift the
focus of interest from short-term to long-term financing.4 How-
ever, there is no basis for concluding that it also strengthened the
demand for long-term debt relative to the demand for equity
funds.
As for small and medium—sized cbrporations, the ratios of fixed
to total assets for the samples available fluctuated within a narrow
range during the entire period studied (Chart i
See Arthur Stone Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations (New York,
Third Revised Edition, 1934)pp.471—76. Dewing summarizes a 1929studyshowing
that the demand for short-term bank credit was reduced by a rising ratio of fixed
capital to current capital for a group of 169manufacturingand trade corporations:
2.05in1919,4.35in 1931.
Samples of Wisconsin manufacturing and trade concerns with total assets of $s
millionand less, a sample of medium-sized Massachusetts corporations going back to
1903,andsamples of corporations in five small manufacturing industries covering
the period 1926—36 yield evidences of increase and decrease in the fixed capital com-
ponent of total assets for Certain years and for certain industrial groups, but in general
the data indicate stability in this ratio. For descriptions of the samples see Charles L.
Merwin, Financing Small Corporations in Five Manufacturing Industries, 1926—36
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1942)Chap-
ter z, and Sidney S. Alexander, Changes in the Financial Structure of American Busi-
nessEnterprise,1900—1940(NationalBureau of Economic Resarch, Financial Re-
search Program, ms. 1943)AppendixA. A comparison of the Wisconsin sample ratios
with ratios computed from Statistics of Income data for all corporations in the
to and to size groups shows that the direction of move-
ment of the Wisconsin sample ratios is generally consistent with the behavior of ratios
for all small and medium-sized concerns but that the level is sometimes different. This
difference in level is not important in the present study, however, since the analysis
depends primarily on the direction of change in asset structure.80 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
Chart r6 —RATIOSOF SELECTED ASsET ITEMS TO TOTAL AssE'rsFOR






'The fixed asset component of public utilities showed virtually no
change over the period, and that of railroads increased only mod-
erately. In view of these facts it is likely that the changes in the de-
mand for credit by public utilities and railroads, compared with
demands from other businesses, were due primarily to the relative
growth of public utilities and railroads within the economy as
a whole. An implication of this relative growth is that the average
ratio of fixed assets to total assets for the whole economy was raised,
thus tending to promote a shift toward the use of long-term funds.
Investments in Other Companies
Investments in other companies (as distinct from marketable
securities) are asset items that a company would be expected to
finance with long-term funds. It is significant, therefore,. that
among large manufacturing corporations investments in other con-
cerns grew rather steadily throughout the entire period studied,
increasing from aroundpercent of total assets in 1914 to about
jo percent in 1940 (Chart This is also true of various manu-
facturing subgroups, from 1920 to 1930, of large trade com-














Greater bank indebtedness of small and medium-sized corporations, com-
pared with large corporations, after World War I may be explained in
part by the marked differences between the two groups in changes in as-
set structure.BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 81
facturing concerns, investments (which in this case include market-
able securities) rose fairly steadily in relative importance from 1916
to 1935, but those for the small and medium-sized trade concerns
remained about constant. Thus the tendency for business concerns to
hold investments in other companies, reflecting the growth of the
business concern as a financing agency as well as the consolidation
movement of the period, increased after 1914, and was especially
marked during the twenties. As in the case of fixed assets, this tend-
ency served to place increasing emphasis on long-term financing.
Total Noncurrent Assets
In order to obtain a measure of what may be termed total "non-
current" assets, fixed assets may be combined with investments in
other companies and with the relatively small item "other noncur-
rent assets." Ratios of noncurrent to total assets for samples of large
manufacturing and trade concerns are available for the period from
1914 to 1940, and for a sample of large industrial corporations be-
ginning in 1900.6 These data suggest an important conclusion,
namely, that for most of the period from 1900 to 1932 total bank
loans to business moved inversely with the ratios of noncurrent to
total assets; during the twenties both bank loans to business and the
ratios of noncurrent to total assets were nearly constant. This rela-
tionship between the asset structure of business and outstanding
bank loans to business reflects the broad causal connection between
the character of business assets and the types of funds which have
been used in their financing.
Cash and Marketable Securities
Since the demand for financing facilities is affected by the holding
of cash and its equivalent (i.e., marketable securities), considerable
significance attaches to the changes between 1900 and 1940 in this
measure •f business liquidity. The analysis is complex, however,
and can best be presented as changes that took place in three aspects
The sample for large industrial corporations is a changing sample based on large
manufacturing and a few large trade corporations taken from Moody's Manuals.
Because of the changing composition of the sample, the median of individual com-
pany ratios is used for the analysis of the sample of large industrial concerns, rather
than a ratio of aggregated balance sheet items which is used in the analysis of other
samples of large manufacturing and trade corporations.82 BUSINESS FINANCE ANDBANKING
of the cash position of corporations: the ratio of cash to total assets;
the relation between cash holdings and the volume of transactions
calling for the use of cash (which determines whether a business has
"free" cash); and the role of the cash account in supplying and ab-
sorbing funds for corporate enterprises during periods of expansion
and contraction.
Over the period 1900 to 1940 the ratio of cash to total assets for
the sample of large industrial corporations tended generally up—
ward, with the rise particularly marked after 1937 (chart I 5).
Forsamples of industrial subgroups of large manufacturing con-
cerns, which extend from 1914 to 1940, it is found that in certain
cases —e.g.,tobacco, textiles, and meat packing —theratios of
cash and its equivalent changed very little; in other cases —e.g.,
automobiles, chemicals, food, and machinery —theratios rose
fairly steadily. Among large trade corporations the trend was gen-
erally upward after 1916.Onthe other hand, small and medium-
sized Wisconsin manufacturing and trade concerns showed no
strong tendency to hold an increasing proportion of their assets in
the form of cash (Chart i6).
A tendency for concerns to hold "excess" amounts of cash, if it
did prevail, clearly would suggest a weakening demand for external
funds. Examination of the relation between cash holdings of cor-
porations and the volume of transactions calling for the use of cash
reveals that ."( i)in the twenties transaction needs appear to have
determined the level of cash balances of large manufacturing cor-
porations, if year-to-year fluctuations are neglected... inthe
thirties a large part of the cash balances of large manufacturing
corporations was 'free' cash —anincreasing part in recession and a
decreasing part in expansion, (3) for medium-sized and small
manufacturing corporations, 'free' cash increased after but in
relation to transaction cash it was not so great as in the case of large
manufacturing
Finally, it is found that the process of accumulation and deple-
tion of cash by business concerns is significantly related to their use
of outside funds. The data indicate that during periods of business
contraction in the thirties, when ratios of short-term debt to total
TFriedrichA. Lutz, Corporate Cash Balances, 1914—43:Manufacturingand Trade
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1945)p.50.
Fordescription of method of estimating "free" cash, see Lutz, pp. 40—41.BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 83
assets were low, large companies could hardly avoid accumulating
large cash balances, since even a modest rise of the cash ratio was
sufiucient to provide the means for extinguishing debt. For these
companies the only alternatives to cash accumulation during periods
of contraction were retirement of long-term debt and the disburse-
ment of unearned dividends.
As a result of cash accumulation, a subsequent increase of sales
could be handled by. a transformation of cash into inventory and
other assets: Only when activity had risen to a level at which an ex-
pansion of assets was required, and even then only when asset expan-
sion was prolonged and at a high rate, was substantial recourse to
outside sources of funds essential. Thus, if the depression were
severe and the contraction of operating assets led to very large
accumulations of cash, the effect on the demand for short-term
credit would be prolonged as well as immediate. In some such
fashion the depression of the early thirties served not only to reduce
the demand for bank credit during the contraction years but limited
the demand for credit during the subsequent expansion below what
it would otherwise have been.
The cash holdings policy of small and medium-sized concerns, at
least as illustrated by the sample based upon Wisconsin corpora-
tions, was quite different. Since corporations of this size group had
ratios of notes payable to total assets that were higher than those of
large concerns, a greater transformation of noncash into cash assets
was required before any ultimate increase in the ratio of cash to
total assets could take place. As cash was released from operating
assets during a period"of business contraction it was used to retire
debt and, therefore, the concerns were more needful of outside
financing facilities when an expansion of assets was called for. The
general result was that small concerns were, relatively speaking,
both more heavily and more persistently indebted to banks than
were the large concerns.
Trade credit used by manufacturing and trade enterprises, was
far less affected by varying cash conditions than was bank credit.
The use of trade credit seems to have been determined almost auto-
matically by purchases. This relative immunity to cash conditions
partly accounted for the fact that trade credit was a more persistent
element .than bank credit in the short-term debt structure of manu-
facturing and trade companies.84 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
Receivables
On the whole between 1914 and 1940, the structural and proce-
dural changes in American business affecting receivables were such
as to weaken the demand for short-term bank credit to busi-
ness. From i 914 to 1920 an expanding volume of business and
sharply rising prices caused receivables of large corporations to in-
crease relative to total assets, and encouraged the greater short-term
bank financing which marked this period. The deflation of the
receivables item in 1921—22 coincided with declining business bor-
rowings from the banks. And, finally, the failure of receivables to
grow commensurately with other business assets during the twenties
was doubtless a significant factor in preventing bank loans to busi-
ness from rising appreciably during that period of general economic
and financial growth. As indicated in Chart i 7, the only receivables
to total assets ratio showing a tendency to advance during the
twenties is that for small and medium-sized trade concerns. A fur-
ther point of interest is that throughout the entire period studied
the relative importance of receivables among assets was greater for
small and medium-sized concerns than for large companies.
The ratio of. sales to receivables reflects the same general
tural change in business assets as does the ratio of receivables to total
assets; the sales ratio, however, has the advantage of bei.ng a direct
measure of the increasing tendency for sales to be made on a cash
basis. For large manufacturing concerns the period 1920—37 was
one during which cash selling (or sales on increasingly shorter
credit terms) became more extensive, especially in the early part of
the perio.d when readjustments were being made following World
War 1. For large trade companies the ratio rose sharply during the
early and middle twenties and then declined between 1927 and
1940, reflecting greater extensions of consumer credit. Further-
more, within this size group those industries whose financial growth
was most marked either evidenced an especially strong tendency
toward a higher ratio of sales to receivables or held persistently to
a ratio considerably higher than that characteristic of industries
growing less rapidly.
Inventory .
Thecredit market in the first three or four decades of the century
was also influenced by changes in the inventory-holding policies ofChart 17 —SELECTEDASSET AND SALES RATIos FOR SAMPLES OF MANu-

























































—Large Corporations •—— Small and Medium—Sized Corporations
For large manufacturing corporations especially, receivables tended
to become less important relative to total assets during the twenties,
and sales volume tended to generate fewer receivables. Inventory as
a proportion of total assets for this group showed little over-all
change, while for trade corporations the relative importance of in-
ventory increased somewhat. For the period as a whole no change
in the turnover of inventory is apparent, but during the twenties in-
ventory was used with increasing efficiency by both groups.86. BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
nonfinancial business. For large manufacturing corporations, inven-
tory as a proportion of total assets showed little over-all change
between 1914 and 1940, although some decline did occur in the
twenties and early thirties (Chart 17). The situation was different,
however, for large trade concerns; in this case the relative impor-
tance of inventory grew somewhat during the whole period, and
markedly in the twenties and again in the middle thirties. As for
small and medium-sized concerns in both manufacturing and trade,
ratios were distinctly lower at the end of the period than at the
beginning.
The quantitative degree to which this structural change in assets
influenced the business credit market cannot, of course, be assessed
definitely. But it is clear that a reduction in the relative importance
of the current asset most closely linked to the use of short-term
credit would tend to produce .a decline in the requirements for
short-term financing. Stated differently, the decrease in 'the rela-
tive importance of inventory, together with changes in other asset
items, doubtless prevented short-term bank credit from sharing
fully in the business expansion of the twenties.
Confirming these findings are ratios of sales to inventory, which
reflect the efficiency of inventory use (Chart 17). In nearly all
branches of manufacturing the efficiency with which inventory was
used increased somewhat during the twenties, but when ratios for
the beginning and the end of the period 1915—40 are compared
there is no indication of long-term improvement. Among large
integrated trade concerns there was no tendency toward increased
efficiency in the use of inventory during the twenties, with the excep-
tion of large department stores.
Summary
During both World War I and the period of continued price in-
crease ending in I changes in the asset structure of business —
suchas a declining proportion of fixed to total assets and increasing
ratios of receivables and inventory to total assets and to sales —
clearlystrengthened the demand for short-term credit which oc-
curred at that time. Asset changes from 1920 to 1922, also respon-
sive to reductions in the price level, contributed to the short-term
debt liquidation of those years.BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 87
The fact that bank loans to business did not increase in the expan-
sionary period following the price decline after World War I may
also be explained in part by certain structural changes in business
assets. Fixed assets grew in relative importance, while the assets
normally associated with the use of short-term funds, namely,
inventory and receivables, became relatively less important ele-
ments in the business asset structure. That these changes were
especially marked in the industries which were growing most
rapidly, thus affecting the average asset structure of the economy
as a whole, further enhanced their effect on the demand for short-
term financing.
Finally, while the decline in short-term credit which began in
1929, and the increase that followed during the recovery of the
middle thirties, were dominated by cyclical changes in economic
activity, changes in asset structure also contributed to changes in
the demand for credit by business during those years. This fact
is indicated by the increase during the early thirties in the amount
of "free" cash holdings, and by the continued decline in the ratio
of inventory and of receivables to total assets. Likewise the re-
covery of bank loans to business after 1935 seems to have been
affected by asset-structure changes calculated to promote the in-
creased use of short-term funds.
CHANGES IN BUSINESS LIABILITIES AND THEIR
EFFECTS ON THE CREDIT MARKET
The liability structure of nonfinancial business —thatis, the divi-
sion of business liabilities into net worth and debt, and of the latter
into various classes of debt —reflectsall forces influencing the
financing policies of business. Among these forces are changes in
asset structure, discussed above, and also changing preferences on
the part of business management as to financing methods, which
may be quite independent of changes in the character of the assets
to be financed.
Net Worth
The outstanding feature of corp orate financial structure in the
entire period I 900 to 1940 is the preponderance of ownership funds88 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
Charsx8 — SELECTEDLIABILITY ITEMS INas a means of financing
PERCENT OF TOTAL LIABILITIES FOR A C0Mbusiness.8 This has to be




changes in liability struc-
ture. It means that other
types of funds represent
1.3very small percentages of
the total funds in use; as
a result, changes in •the
relative position of any of
these other items (notes
payable,forexample,
which is generally small
in terms of total assets)
o arehighly significant in
terms of total demand for
2.9the type of funds in ques-
tion. Thus, if total assets
the same, a rise
____________________________
from 2 to 4 percent in the
ratio of notes payable to
From 1900 tO 1920, debt items total assets, while of neg—
grew asnet worth fell;until ligible effect on the ratio
1932. the opposite was true. After
1932 debt items either stabilized of equity to total funds,
or began to rise, while net worth means a doubling of the
declined, absolute amount of the
short-termfundsbor-
rowed.
Certain significant changes in the relative importance of equity
funds during the period 1900—1940 are revealed by data covering
a sample of large manufacturing and trade corporations,combined
(Chart 18). These data show that the ratio of net worth to total
liabilities declined between 1900 and 1921 —especiallyafter I 914
as debt financing wasutilized for war production and postwar inven-
tory expansion; that from 1922 until 1932 therelative impor-
tance of ownership funds increased fairlysteadily; and that this
See footnote 3, above.
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increase was followed by a decline through 1940. These findings,
in general, are confirmed by other samples of financial statements
(Chart 19),° and by the industrial subdivisions of these samples.
To be sure, the tendency for equity funds to increase in rela-
tive importance during the twenties was sharper in some indus-
tries than in others. The rise was especially evident for concerns
in meat packing and tobacco and to a mild extent for machinery
manufacturers, but an increase did not occur among companies in
the building materials, rubber, and petroleum industries. For these
industries the failure of equity to show any noticeable growth in
importance may be attributed, to a great extent, to the fact that it
had already reached a higher than average level. For large trade
companies the decline during World War I was much more marked
than for large manufacturing companies and it continued until
1920; but after the sharp deflation of current liabilities in 1921—22
there was a growth in the importance of equity funds, although it
was somewhat less for large trade than for large manufacturing
concerns.
Data on the liability structure of small and medium-sized Wis-
consin concerns, taken as a whole, indicate an upward drift in the
percentage of equity funds to tot.al assets among trade concerns and
a downward drift among manufacturing companies. This attrition
of net worth shown by manufacturing concerns is confirmed by data
for a sample of Massachusetts corporations of small and medium
size and by TNEC data for small and medium-sized concerns in
five manufacturing industries over the years 1926—36. The impor-
tance. of this development to credit extending institutionsis
heightened by the fact that the level of the ratio of net worth to
total liabilities for small and medium-sized concerns is persistently
below the level characteristic of large concerns.
Among railroad and public utility companies, where equity
funds have traditionally been less important .than long-term debt
funds in comparison with other industrial groups, the role of
equity funds increased after the end of World War I. The change
was not marked, however.
The differences observable can be attributed in part to the fact that the data in
Chart i 9 are ratios of aggregated balance sheet items for manufacturing and trade
concerns examined separately, while the data in Chart i 8 are medians of individual
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In all groups of concerns, equity funds exceeded all other types. World
War I was a period of relatively increasing debt, especially the short-
term type. During the twenties, debt fell relative to equity except for
small and medium-sized concerns.BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 91
Debt
At least for large industrial corporations, the corporate financial
history of the first half of the forty-year period under review was
significantly different from that of the second half. In the first
twenty years, broadly speaking, large manufacturing and trade
concerns financed an increasing, though always modest, proportion
of their total assets with borrowed funds (Chart i 8). While this
increase in debt was not continuous and was confined within, rela-
tively small limits, the direction is nonetheless clear. From I 920
until the early thirties the general drift of the ratio of debt to total
liabilities was downward, reflecting the increase in the relative
importance of equity funds commented on above. After 1932 the
tendency for debt to increase was most noticeable for accounts pay-
able and "other" current liabilities.
Among small and medium-sized trade concerns there was also a
general tendency for the relative importance of debt to contract
after 1920; but for small and medium-sized manufacturing cor-
porations the importance of debt relative to equity showed a fairly
persistent rise from 1916 to 1940, a fact which is in sharp contrast
to the results for other sectors of the business economy.
The implications of these facts for the business credit market
are clear. In the first twenty years of the century the demand for
debt funds was promoted by two expansionary forces: first, the
growth of the economic system as a whole, and second, the tendency
for business management to rely increasingly on 'debt funds in
financing assets. From 1920 to the early thirties, on the other hand,
the opposite was true: not only did the rate of growth of the eco-
nomic system moderate considerably, but 'debt became a less
important element in corporate financing.
Within the general category of debt, what changes occurred in
the relative importance of short-term and long-term debt and,
within the limited category of short-term debt, between notes and
accounts payable? For the sample of' large industrial companies,
which is heavily weighted by manufacturing concerns, the ratios
of both long-term and short-term debt to total assets increased from
I 900 to 1914, although the course of the former was the more
erratic. During World War I the short-term debt element gained
considerably while long-term debt was reduced, a development92 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING.
that would be expected in. view of the financial problems of war
production; while in the twenties and early thirties the ratios of
both elements to total assets declined.'0
The ratios for the two categories of short-term debt —i.e.,
notes and accounts payable which may be taken to be broadly repre-
sentative of bank credit and trade credit, respectively —increased
between 1900 and 1920, with that for notes payable rising the more
sharply, to a level above accounts payable. In the declines that
occurred during the debt deflation of the second twenty years of the
century, notes payable fell to, and remained at, a lower level than
accounts payable.
At several points in the analysis of the 1940 business credit mar-
ket, in Chapters i and 2, it was remarked that accounts payable
represented a far more frequent and quantitatively important form
of business financing than did notes payable. The data in the
present chapter reveal that this has always been a feature of large
manufacturing trade corporations and probably also of small
and medium-sized con.cerns. Our materials at present are so limited,
however, that it is impossible to say what proportion of trade credit
is substitutive for some other form of financing, and what part
merely reflects the fact that it is convenient and conventional for
business concerns to buy merchandise, on open account, with the
result that even though concerns take up these accounts promptly
there is always a substantial. "float" of trade debt in the business
system. For a thorough understanding of the business credit mar-
ket, more detailed data are essential on trade credit, and on its rela-
tion to other forms of asset financing at different times and for
different types of concerns.
Self-Financing by Business
Since the business credit market would be adversely affected by a
tendency toward financial seif-sufliciency among business concerns,
any long-run changes that may have occurred in the comparative
importance of what may be called and funds
are significant. The term "external" funds means those acquired
10Amonglarge trade concerns long-term debt practically disappeared, which
accounts in part for the difference between the sample of large industrial corporations
(including several large trade concerns) in Chart iSandthe sample for large manu-
facturing companies shown in Chart 19.BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 93
from sources outside the business, and "internal" funds, those
acquired through the retention of corporate earnings.1'
The first observation suggested by the data in Chart 20 is that
the tendency or "propensity" of to retain earnings
—whichmay be termed the rate, of earnings retention —changed
very little, when measured by the ratio of earnings retained over a
given year to total assets at the beginning of the year;'2 in fact it
might be described as showing a slight downward drift. Second,
the rate of total asset expansion, measured by the ratio of asset
expansion over a given year to total assets at the beginning of the
year, was a more variable element in corporate finance than was
the rate of earnings retention. Third, since the use of funds
acquired externally is measured by the difference between these
two rates, it follows that changes in the degree of dependence on
external funds was more nearly determined by changes in the rate
of total asset expansion than by changes in the propensity of busi-
ness to retain earnings.
Manufacturing and trade concerns apparently did not become
more independent of outside financing to meet their needs for asset
expansion. On the contrary, it appears that whenever asset expansion
proceeded at a rapid, and particularly at an accelerating, rate, a
vigorous demand for external funds was generated; but this de-
mand was not sustained by the mere maintenance of a given rate
of expansion, even at a relatively high level. In the early stages
of' expansion business concerns may overestimate their needs for
external financing; furthermore, in such a period it is almost cer-
tain that profits will be high and that retained earnings will increase
more rapidly than dividend disbursements.
These generalizations regarding the relation between retained
earnings and the need for external funds are broadly confirmed by
the record from 1915 to 1940. Among large manufacturing cor-
porations, retained earnings as a source of funds for business ëxpan—
•" Granted that in certain instances a concern may achieve a higher degree of produc-
tivity through the investment of depreciation accruals, no expansion of assets results.
Since the present study is concerned with the financing of asset expansion, depreciation
accruals are not viewed as a means of self-financing. It may be noted, however, that
gross property expenditure, inclusive of depreciation outlays (replacements), shows
a remarkably constant relationship to sales from 1924to194.2forour saqiple of
large manufacturing concerns.
12Thisis the most significant measure for the present study because itrelates
retained earnings directly to business assets, which comprise the quantity to be financed.94 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
sion were most important in the twenties, since the financial prob—
1cm for these concerns, as measured by total asset expansion, was
far less in the twenties than in the war years. For large trade enter-
prises, the rate of expansion in the late twenties was as high as
in 1915—20; consequently, in both periods these concerns showed
about the same degree of dependence on outside funds. In the
thirties, however, both asset expansion and earnings retention were
at low levels, and except in 1936, 1939, and 1940 lirge trade
corporations made virtually no use of funds other than those
accumulated through earnings retention.
The retention of earnings ceased to be an important source of
funds for small and medium-sized companies at the outset of the
depression in 1930. During earlier years internal funds had persist-
ently supplied the major part of the funds needed for asset ex-
pansion. In the thirties, however, these smaller companies were
using up rather than accumulating funds; outside funds acquired
were largely in the form of short-term bank borrowings.
All types of external funds shared the broad demand created by
the high rate of asset expansion during World War I. This fact
is reflected especially in the rising importance of notes payable
among the liabilities of large corporations. During the twenties
and early thirties, when the balance shifted definitely toward
equity financing, the debt funds acquired were increasingly of the
long-term variety. The experience of large and small concerns
differed somewhat. Over the whole period, 1916—40, short-term
external funds, as a means of financing asset expansion, were more
important for small and medium-sized trade concerns than they
were for large corporations. This was also true for small and
medium-sized manufacturing corporations, althoughforthis
group long-term funds showed a tendency to increase in importance
during the twenties.
Summarizing, the business credit market during the twenties
was affected by two principal developments: first, business assets
expanded at a slower rate from 1923 to 1928 than during the
preceding war period, which meant that there was less scope for
external financing; and, second, a shift toward equity financing
occurred, especially among large concerns, which was an important
reason for the failure of bank loans to business to increase. In the
years 1929 to 1935 the dominant forces affecting the business creditBANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 95
Chart20— ASSETEXPANSION, RETAINED EARNINGS, AND EXTERNAL FUNDS
ACQUIRED, IN PERCENT OF BEGINNING-OF-YEAR TOTAL ASSETS, FOR SAM.-
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Asset expansion varied considerably more than retained earnings. As a
result, access to external funds was needed mainly in years in which
asset expansion was high.96 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
market were the contraction of total business assets and thetendency
for contractive forces to have a greater effect on notes payable than
on other business liabilities. Following 1935 there was a reversal of
this situation; and it is interesting to note that large manufacturing
corporations in 1937, when the rate of total asset expansion was
nearly as high as in 1929, depended as much on external sources of
funds as during any year of the twenties.
CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE SHORT-TERM
CREDIT MARKET
Relation of Bank Credit to Trade Credit
After the early twenties total short-term credit to business came to
consist increasingly of trade credit and decreasingly of credit ex-
tended directly by banks. Among large manufacturing companies
in the twenties accounts payable, which may be taken as a measure
of trade credit, fell less in proportion to total assets than did notes
payable. This tendency for trade credit to grow relative to bank
credit continued during the recovery years of the thirties when, as
would be expected, indebtedness on accounts payable rose more
promptly and more substantially than did the notes payable of
manufacturing concerns. The same general experience seems to have
been shared by large trade concerns, including department stores,
but not so markedly as among large manufacturing companies.
The small and medium-sized manufacturing corporations fol—
lowed fairly well the same pattern as the large manufacturing con-
cerns; that is, trade credit grew relative to bank credit. But for
small and medium-sized trade concerns the ratio of accounts to
notes payable fell during the twenties, indicating an increasing
relative dependence on bank credit as contrasted with trade supplier
credit.
•As pointed out above, the importance of trade credit as an
element in corporate financial structure and the fact that it exceeds
bank credit in magnitude make it particularly unfortunate that so
little is known about its character and composition. Because of this
gap in our knowledge the remainder of this discussion must be
limited to changes in that section of the short-term credit market
represented by notes payable.BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 97
Industry of Borrower
The earliest date for which information is available on the indus-
trial characteristics of commercial bank borrowers is 1920. In that
year the Comptroller of the Currency requested all national banks
to furnish, as of November i.g "...astatement showing the
amount of loans and accommodations granted by them to certain
classes of borrowers arranged according to the occupation." Reports
received covered only 70 percent of the total loans and discounts
of national banks, but unreported loans presumably were not of the
types indicated in the Comptroller's classification, since banks were
requested to report on all loans in "certain classes." For comparison
with this early cross-section, commercial bank borrowers in 1940
can be classified by industry on the basis of estimates made by the
Financial Research Program (Table i i). Margins of error doubt-
less are present in both distributions, but they probably are not
large enough to destroy the value of the data for indicating broad
changes since 1920.18
The first major change to be noted is the decline in the rela-
tive importance of manufacturing and trade borrowers. These two
classes combined accounted for close to 50 percent of total loans
and discounts in 1920 and only about 20 percent in 1940.
Secondly, finance companies which were borrowers of negligible
importance in 1920, occupied a position of prominence in 194Q,
when they accounted for nearly 9 percent of all loans. This change
is doubtless related to the declining importance of manufacturing
andtrade borrowings, since cash is substituted for the receivables of
selling enterprises through finance company operations.
•Thirdly, the growth of the public utility group nearly equaled
that of the finance companies; public utilities accounted for slightly
more than 7 percent of total loans and discounts in 1940, compared
with less than 2 percent in 1920.
All these changes in.the composition of the borrower clientele
of commercial banks conform to the general findings reviewed
above relating to the industrial composition of the economy.
Both distributions include agricultural and real estate loans. Since these are not
strictly "business loans" in the sense in which business loans have been taken for the
purposes of this study, it might be advisable to exclude them from both distributkns,
but this procedure would not alter the main conclusions drawn from the distribution
of total loans as given below.98 BIJSI•NESS FINANCE AND BANKING
Table ii— TOTALNATIONAL BANK LOANS AND Dis-
BY INDUSTRY OF BORROWER AND TYPE OF
LOAN, AND [940
(dollar figures in millions)
November1920a June 30,
Industry of Borrower AmountPercent of AmountPercent of
and Type of Loan OutstandingTotal LoansOutstandingTotal Loans








railroads 225 i.6 7.2
Agriculture 14.5 622 6.8
Construction
C C 76 .8
Mining
C 0 76 .8
Service
C C 76 .8
Commercial finance companies .
and factors
C C 804. 8.8
Professional men 375 2.7
C
Real estate 232" 1.7 2,003 21.9
Brokers and dealers in se-
curities 664 4.7 169 i.8
Banks
C C 19 .2
Acceptances 171b 1.2 83 .9
Commercial paper bought in
the open market
C C 215 2.3
Other loans against securities i8.z 1,573 17.2
Unclassifiedd i,i66 8.5 884 9.6
TOTAL $13,765 ioo.o% $9,174ioo.o%
a Basedon data from Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, I 9Z0, Vol. I, p.32.
b Estimates of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Pro-
gram.
C Contained in "Unclassified."
d Includes consumer loans; loans to personal loan companies, industrial banks, and
credit unions; loans (other than real estate) to building and loan associations, insurance
companies, Federal Land and Intermediate Credit Banks, Federal Home Loan Banks,
clubs, churches, hospitals, schools, and charitable institutions.
Size of Borrowing Concerns
While no direct evidence is available for measuring changes in the
average size of borrowing concerns, certain generalizations can be
made on the basis of indirect evidence. A sample of 84 large manu-
facturing corporations shows that they were relatively heavy bankBANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 99
borrowers in 1920 and 1937, years of rapidly accelerating asset ex-
pansion (Table 12). However, their relative importance among
all business borrowers declined during the twenties and again in the
late thirties; by 1939 their borrowings were less important than in
1914. Apparently the growth of the large business concern in this
sector of the economy was insufficient over the entire period to main-
tain the relative importance of large companies among bank bor-
rowers, because large concerns, individually, were becoming less
dependent onbanks for short-term credit.
An indication that the average size of borrowing concern may
have increased is found in the fact that the finance company and the
transportation and other public utility industries rose in importance
among bank borrowers; the maj or share of the business of all these
groups was conducted by concerns of large and increasing average
size. On the other hand, listings in, the Reference Book of Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. reveal that between 1920 and i 940 wholesalers,
traditionally frequent and heavy borrowers from banks, declined
Table 12—NoTEs PAYABLE OF 84 LARGE MANUFACTUR-
ING COMPARED WITH BUSINESS LOANS OF
NATIONAL BANKS, 19 14—39
(dollar figures in billions)
Year

















































a Dataas of December 31.Compilationsof National Bureau of Economic Research,
Financial Research Program.
b Data as of June 30. Estimates of National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial
Research Program, based on Report of theComptrollerof Me Currency, annually.
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in average size, as measured by net worth, and that service concerns,
which are typically small, increased markedly in their relative
frequency in the business system. The significance of this latter
development is lessened, of course, by the fact that in 1940 service
concerns still accounted for a very small segment of the demand for
credit from banks.
The relative importance of these conflicting developments cannot
be weighed definitely, and therefore it is impossible to reach a final
conclusion as to the average size of borrowing concerns in 1940
compared with 1920. Study of the American business credit market
around 1940 (Chapter i) has shown that small and medium-sized
concerns were the predominant users of business credit at that time.
Perhaps the most that can be said is that there is no positive evi-
dence to suggest that this condition was different in 1920.
Security for Loans
Since loan statistics for early years refer only to total loans and
discounts, a study of trends in secured loans to business as
distinguished from other loans cannot be made, but data on total
loans and discounts of national banks indicate that collateral secu-
rity tended to become more important. Among this group of banks
the proportion of secured loans to total loans rose from 41.1 per-
cent in 1900 to 55.2.percentin 1940. Most of this increase was
attributable to the growth in the relative importance of real estate
loins. But total loans and discounts exclusive of those secured by
real estate mortgage collateral also reveal a trend toward greater
use of security devices; the proportion of secured loans to total
loans and discounts of national banks, exclusive of loans secured by
real estate, rose from 40.8 percent in 1900 to 52.9 percent in 1930
and then fell back to 43.2 percent in 1940. The rise to the peak in
1930 no doubt reflected the growing importance during the twenties
of loans secured by stock exchange collateral.
of Loans
Of special significance is the fact that the average contractual' matu-
rity of bank loans tended to increase in the period under review. Ac-
cording to reports to the Comptroller of the Currency, about 57BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 101
percent of all bank loans in 1913 were made with original maturi-
ties of less than 90 days. In view of the relative unimportance dur-
ing those early years of loans secured by stock exchange and real es-
tate collateral, it seems reasonable to assign these over-all percent-
ages to business loans, i.e., to say that in 1913 about 57 percent of
bank loans to business were made with original maturities of 90 days
or less. In 1940, on the other hand, about one-third ofthe com-
mercial and industrial loans of all commercial banks consisted of
term loans with original maturities exceeding one year. On the
assumption that one-half of the 1940 loans with maturities of less
than one year carried original maturities of more than 90 days, loans
with maturities of 90 days or under can be estimated as comprising
only slightly more than 30 percent .of all business loans in 1940,




Medium- and long-term business credit outstanding rose sharply
and fairly continuously between 1900 and 1940. The set-back that
occurred in the depression years of the 1930's was followed
by1940 carried total outstandings, including bank
term loans, to a figure five times greater than in 1900 (Table 13).
Coincident with this long-run expansion were significant shifts in
the sources from which medium- and long-term business credit was
acquired. The principal changes were a considerable decline in the
proportion of such funds 'acquired from the public, and an increase
in the proportion acquired from financial institutions. Life insurance
companies, whose assets increased nearly eleven-fold between 1906
and 1940, played an outstanding role in this increasing institution-
alization of .the investment process.
Character of Debt
The changing character of medium-term and long-term business
debt may be measured by changes in outstanding corporate bonds
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after 1900 Was for the average size of outstanding corporate bond
issues to increase. Medium-term issues, that is those with an original
maturity of from i through ig years, rose in median, size from
$3.8 million in 1900 to $17.0 million in 1939, while issues of long
term, that is those with an original maturity of oVer 15 years, rose
during the same period from $15.0 million to $32. i million. These
observations are confirmed by data on yearly offerings. Bonds of
under $i million represented 13.6 percent of all amounts offered
in 1900, 9.4 percent in 1910, 6.7 percent in 1920, 2.1' percent in
1930, and 0.9 percent in 1938. The average asset size of corpora-
tions issuing bonds also increased: the median size of concerns
issuing medium-term bonds rose from $68 million to $163 million,
while the median size of concerns issuing long-term bonds rose
from $83.5 rnillion.to $191 million.
During the same period marked changes occurred in the indus-
trial composition of the corporate bond market. Among issuers of
medium-term bonds the order of relative importance in 1900 was
railroads, first; other public utilities, second; and manufacturing
concerns, third. By 1939 this order was wholly reversed, with
manufacturing in first and railroads in third place, and with the
distributive and service industries in a position of far greater
importance than in 1900. Among issuers of long-term bonds,
lic utilities replaced railroads as the most important single industry;
distributive and service industries grew substantially in importance;
and within the manufacturing group the relative importance of such
industries as chemicals, petroleum, rubber, and iron and steel in-
creased.
The term to maturity of corporate bonds tended to become less
dispersed and to concentrate at the intermediate level, both the very
short and the very long maturities being less important components
of the total at the end of the period than, at the beginning. Finally,
there was a marked tendency away from secured issues, which fell
from 91 percent of total outstandings in 1900 to 42 percent in
1939, and a clear tendency, especially among medium-term bonds,
for refinancing issues to increase in relative amount.
Since these data refer to all corporate debt securities outstanding
or offered during the period, no direct inferences are possible con-
cerning changes in the characteristics of corporate debt securities
held by commercial banks. Not only would the exercise of manage-104 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
rial judgment lead banks to hold something other than a random
sample of outstanding securities, but banks have been subject to
changing legal limitations over the years, which have affected their
freedom in investment policy. The character of this legislation will
be reviewed in Chapter 8; in general it served increasingly to limit
banks to the holding of bonds of relatively high grade. A reasonable
conclusion, therefore, is that data on the composition of their port-
folios, if available, would reveal the same broad shifts shown by
data on all outstanding bonds, namely, tendencies toward larger
size of issue and of obligor and toward intermediate-term issues
(from five to fifteen years) would frequently be unsecured.
Direct Lending to Business
In the thirties an outstanding development in the long-term seg-
ment of the business credit market, which apparently had no paral.-
lel in the short-term segment, was the growth in the relative impor-
tance of direct lending, in contrast to the acquisition of funds in
the open market. Private placements of corporate securities
accounted for 29.2 percent of the total gross proceeds of all corpo-
rate securities issued in 1934—35; the percentage rose to 42.4 per-
cent in 1942—43, and then fell to 31.2 percent in 1943—44.
After 1934 certain shifts occurred in the general character of
issues privately placed and in the agencies active in this market, but
the data pertaining to the shifts are not wholly satisfactory and the
period for which they are available is so short that it is hazardous
to venture definite conclusions as to the direction of change. In
general, the insurance company seems to have become a more im-
portant factor in the private placement market, accounting for an
estimated 6o percent of private placements in 1934 and about 87
percent in 1939 and 1940. Somewhat erratic variation is found in
the industrial composition of private placements; on the whole,
industrial corporations became a smaller proportion of the total,
and public utilities a larger proportion. Data are not available on
the average size and term to maturity of private placements and on
changes in these features of the issues over recent years.
In the medium-term field the term loan grew from negligible
amounts in 1933 to a point where, in 1940, such loans held by com-
mercial banks equaled one-half of all corporate securities held by theBANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 105
banks. However, the period for which data on these credits are avail-
able is short and it is again hazardous to venture generalizations on
changes in the nature of the market up to 1940. The evidence sug-
gests, at least, that the tendency was for term loans to be made in
smaller average amounts, increasingly to smaller companies, and,
toward the end of the period, increasingly for new money as con-
trasted with refinancing purposes.
POSITION OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK AS A.
BUSINESS FINANCING
In order to study changes in the functional position of the corn-
niercial banking system since 1900, it is convenient to divide bank
assets into the broad categories of "business" loans (including loans
•to financial enterprises other than banks), loans secured by real
estate, other loans (including agricultural loans and loans secured.
by stock collateral), "business" securities, and other
securities. A further breakdown which would separate out loans on
stock exchange collateral, consumer loans, term loans, and various
types of investment securities would be useful, but the principal
purposes of this study are satisfied by the broad categories indicated.
The data presented in Charts 21 and 22 cover national banks only
—anunavoidable limitation since this is the only group of banks
for which satisfactory estimates of this distribution of assets for
earlier years can be made. Nonetheless these data may be taken as
fairly representative of the commercial banking system as a whole.
The history of structural change between 1900 and 1940 in the
assets of commercial banks falls naturally into five fairly distinct
periods: 1900—1915, 1916—22, 1923—28, 1929—35, and 1936—40.
From 1900 to 1915 nearly all types of. bank assets grew at about
the same rate which, considering the length of the period, reflects a
remarkable stability in the functional position of the banking sys-
tem.14
14 The increase in total assets of national banks during this period amounted to
about $45o million, annually, or. an average rate of 6 percent per year. The average
rate of increase for business loans also was about 6 percent, and the volume expanded
on the average by about $150 million, annually. When holdings of business securities
areadded to business loans, the average annual increase of this combined series is found
to be $190 million, or an average annual rate of about 7 percent. The average annual
rate of growth for these series, as estimated here, is based on the assumption that the
series increased at a constant rate each year.106 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
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Changesafter 1900 in the earning assets of national banks fall
into five distinct periods, in the first three periods business loans
plus bank investments in private corporate securities rose almost
continuously; it was not until after 1929thata sharp decline
occurred.
S
Inthe period 1916—22, seven years of war and postwar readjust-
ment, nearly all bank assets sh,ared alike in expansion and contrac-
tion; during 1920, however, business loans made by banks expanded
somewhat more than assets as a whole.'5 As revealed in the preced-
ing analysis the changes in corporate financial structure which took
place during the entire period —particularlythose changes that
represented the impact on credit demands of rising commodity
15 Over the entire seven-year period the increase for total assets of national
banks averaged million; that for loans to business, million; and that for
loans to business plus holdings of business securities, $460 million. In -each case the
average dollar increase represented an average annual rate of growth of about 8
percent. -BANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 107
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During the twenties, bank holdings of business securities rose
relative to other assets, but not enough to offset the relative de-
cline of bank loans to business.









prices and inventory values-were such as to increase demands for
short-term relative to long-term financing. But while the asset
structure of banks underwent fairly substantial changes within this
period, the structure at the end was very much like that which had
prevailed at the outset.
Significant changes set in, however, during the period 1923-28.
Despite the fact that the average annual rate of total asset growth
of national banks was almost equal to the 1900-1915 rate (.ç per-
centannually, compared with. 6 percent in the earlier period),the
rate of growth of loans to business(2 percent) was considerably less
than in the earlier years. It is this structural change in bank assets
which is frequently referred to as the "decline" of the commercial108 BUSINESS FINANCE AND BANKING
loan. The decline, however, was merely a loss of relative position
by the "business" loan, and was attributable entirely to the greater
growth of certain other commercial bank lending functions, namely,
loans secured by real estate and by stock exchange collateral, and
heavier investment in corporate securities.
The tendency for bank holdings of business securities to increase
during the years 1923—28 is especially noteworthy. When these
assets are added to bank loans to business, the total is found to have
increased at an average annual rate of 5peicene,which is not far be-
low the average rate of increase during the period 1900—1915.
Since the rate of growth for this combined series in the period
1923—28 was the same as that for total bank assets, its relative
positionamong bank assets at the end of the period differed little
from that at the beginning. This stability, however, veiled a signifi-
cant change in the way in which banks met their continuing business
financing function. During the period, the function was met in-•
creasingly through the purchase and holding of private corporate
securities and the extension of credit on the security of stock ex-
change collateral and real estate mortgages and, relatively speaking,
decreasingly through the extension of business loans of traditional
form. Again, this behavior of bank assets reflects shifts during those
years in corporate asset structure and financial policy. As reviewed
above, all these changes seemed to conspire against the growth of
short-term credit and to promote the more extensive use of medium-
and long-term funds, in the form of debt or equity.
In the years 1929—35 business loans and private corp orate secu-
rities declined more than total bank assets,and in 1936—40 they
failed to recover at as fast a rate and as persistently as total bank
assets. The result is that, while the relative importance among com-
mercial bank assets of business loans and business securities, com-
bined, did not differ markedly in 1928 from what it was in 1900
percentof total assets in 1928 compared with 36 percent in
1900), in 1940 it had fallen to but i8 percent of total bank assets.
It is useful, nevertheless, to distinguish between the periods
1929—35 and 1936—40, because. in the latter period the absolute
amount of bank loans to business was increasing, in sharp contrast to
the years 1929—35 when liquidation by the business economy of its
indebtedness to banks was almost uninterrupted.
Possibly a more effective measure of the changing stake of theBANK RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS 109
commercial banking system in
the business credit market would
be .provided by data on the in-
come derived by banks from vari-
ous types of assets. Such an analy-
sis is impossible, however, since
in distinguishing between income
from loans, investments, and fees
a further distinction cannot be
made between income earned on
funds and seryices extended to
business enterprises for business
purposes and income earned from
other sources,e.g., from con-
sumer loans, government securi-
ties, and the like. In general, the
outstanding facts about the data,
as shown in Chart 23, are, first,
that the relative importance of in-
come from loans and that from
investments remained practically
stable until 1930;second,that
between 1931 and 1935 the f or—
mer lost ground to the latter in a
Chart 23 — GROSSINCOME OF NA-
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The years 193 1—35 witnessed a
rise in the importance of in-
vestments and a decline in the
importance of loans as sources
of bank income. Income from.
services tended persistently to
rise after 1920.
spectacular fashion; and, third,
that this shift in the relative importance of income sources was
checked and even reversed slightly in the last of the periods which
we have selected for our analysis of bank assets, namely, I 936—40.